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Learning Objectives
1. Define Human Factors, and describe the basic Human Factors approach to improving human performance (i.e.,
Personnel Selection, System Design, and Training). 
2. Define the terms "pilot/crew error", and "cause factor", and discuss the correct use, and abuse, of these terms. 
3. Identify eight (8) categories, or sources, of Human error, and discuss the purpose and application of the Checklist in
mishap investigation and prevention.
Introduction
The safety doctrine expressed in OPNAVINST 3750 (par.105) is based on the idea of "necessitarianism", which holds that
events associated with mishaps have preceding "causes". The basis for mishap prevention then lies in a process or "detecting
and eliminating these preceding causes".
In the field of aircraft accident investigation it is well established that the majority of aircraft "mishaps" are related to
human factors. Various statistics, reported by the NTSB and Naval Safety Center (Nagel,1988 and Borowsky,1990) show




The military flier, probably because of his/her unique selection, degree of training, and close supervision is comparatively a
safer airman. If these are the reasons, then we theoretically could do an even better job of reducing the mishap rate by
improving aircrew selection, training, and supervisory practices. To do so, however, we need to develop a better
understanding about "why" pilots and crews are a major factor in aircraft mishaps, and this is what we will attempt to do in
the Aviation Safety Psychology course.
Human Factors Definitions
Human Factors is the study of how people interact with their environments. In the case of Aviation, it is the study of how
pilot and crew performance is affected by such issues as the design of cockpits, human physiological and psychological
variations, and the interaction and communication between crew members, and other participants in the aviation community
(adapted from Trollip and Jensen,1991,p.1-2). The term "Human Factors" implies an application of scientific methods and
technology to solve human performance problems. The field of Human Factors is a recognized professional specialization





that uses an interdisciplinary approach to understanding human performance in complex human-machine systems, such as
those represented in military aviation.
As a professional specialty, Human Factors represents an attempt to optimize the performance of individuals in systems
operation, maintenance, and supervisory control of complex environments exemplified by today's sophisticated aircraft and
support equipment and facilities. Human Factors specialists, typically receive extensive education and training in the fields
of Applied Psychology, Engineering, and Management Science.
One way of summarizing the approach taken by Human Factors specialists is to view its application in complex systems in
the following "triangular" relationship among system Design, Personnel Selection, and Training (unpublished notes,
University of Southern California):
                          Design
                       Human Factors
                Selection          Training
From a "Systems" point of view, we can improve performance, reduce "human error" by concentrating our efforts to insure
that the design of equipment and procedures are adequate, that personnel selected for the job have the capabilities and
competencies necessary, or that these capabilities and competencies can be adequately taught. Most of the time, we can trace
"pilot error", or crew, and/or supervisory errors in mishaps to one or more of the areas shown in the above Human Factors
Triangle.
Pilot/Crew Error.
The term "pilot error", as used here, will refer to an action or inaction (error of commission or omission) that, if not caught
and corrected, could contribute to the occurrence of a mishap or incident (adapted from Trollip and Jensen, 1991,p.1-3).
This definition includes failures in crew communication, inadequate coordination of mission task performance, and
instances of poor judgment and decision making regarding risk assessment and safety of flight.
Cause Factor.
Pilot/Crew error is a "cause factor" in a mishap when its presence, or absence (within reason) increased the likelihood of the
mishap's occurrence. An accurate assessment of mishap cause factors is absolutely essential to establish a sound bases for
application of the correct preventative measures. The Naval Safety Center periodically publishes a list of the most common
aircrew errors, as shown below: (NSC,1991, Five year trend)
Inadequate Crew Coordination
NATOPS (Safety Procedure) Violation * Physical or Mental Condition
Judgment Errors




While the above designations are good "descriptors" concerning human error mishaps, they do not tell us much about the
"Whys". From a human factors standpoint, we need to relate the occurrence of mishaps somehow to the behavior of people
in the performance of their jobs. Accomplishing this goal may be possible if we can more accurately define human factor
"causes" of accidents, improve our understanding of the capabilities and limitations of human performance, and develop
workable mishap prevention measures.
Human Factors Checklist
In order to facilitate the understanding and application of human factors, which underlie most aircraft mishaps, the author
has developed a Human Factors Checklist which is intended to serve as a "user-friendly" accident investigation tool by
identifying potential sources of human error, as well as to formulate a safety program that addresses key factors related to
the prevention of recurring aircrew errors. It is important to recognize that the Human Factors Checklist is designed to
supplement the use of other ongoing accident investigation methodologies and is in no way intended to supplant or
supersede professional investigation practices. Methodologies typically used by some investigators, and the relative merits
of these various methods, were previously reviewed by Bennett (1985). Navy and Marine aircraft mishaps, for example, are
investigated in accordance with The Navy Aviation Safety Program (OPNAV Instruction 3750 series) ,which sets forth
standard practices and methods required by aircraft mishap board investigations.
We know from analysis of mishap cases, experimental studies (many performed in the flight simulator), and field
observations of military operations that we can "explain" some mishaps in terms of typical human capabilities and
limitations. The human dimensions of mishaps, then, can be designated in terms of specific categories of human
performance viewed in the context of a typical operational environment. The Human Factors Checklist, described in this
chapter, has been constructed to help the Navy/Marine Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) to identify some of the typical human
factors contributions during accident investigation and to help them formulate proactive mishap prevention safety programs.
The initial set of descriptive categories for classifying sources of human error underlying some aircraft mishaps was selected
on the basis of a review of numerous military aircraft mishap cases. The major categories chosen are itemized and briefly
described below:
Sensory-Perceptual. Capabilities and limitations in our ability to see, hear, and correctly interpret incoming sensory
information. Errors include those due to misjudgment of altitude, attitude, distance, depth perception, object clearance, and
instances in which performance may be affected by presence of visual and other sensory illusions. This category also
includes instances related to Attention failures, and loss of Situation Awareness.
Case Examples:
* KC-130 -- Struck a berm short of the runway due to presence of known visual illusion (sloping runway)
* CH-53 -- Crashed during section approach in a desert area due to "brownout" and resulting disorientation. (Lost visual
reference cues)
Medical and Physiological. Refers so the physiological or psychological state of a person at the time of a mishap or
incident, resulting from loss of oxygen, physical stressors such as noise, vibration, heat or cold, and physiological factors
such as lack of sleep or inadequate rest, use or exposure to chemical substances (including drugs and alcohol), mental or
impairment from presence of situational or cumulative social stressors.
Errors include flying while sick, flying under the influence of drugs or alcohol (including self-medication), and exceeding
one's own physical endurance or stress coping limits.
Case Examples:
* Helo -- While on route to NVG training area, aircraft impacted ground. Pilot was on medical waiver for glasses, but was
not wearing them.
* AV-8 -- Crashed on take-off, following flap system failure. Pilot was undergoing considerable stress due to family and job
stressors.
Knowledge and Skill. Knowledge refers to our understanding and ability to use information about aircraft systems, flying
conditions, performance limits of the aircraft, mission task requirements, weather, etc. Skill refers to our ability to perform
tasks and task sequences at the right time and in the right order, and our ability to physically handle the aircraft with the
accuracy and precision required for specific conditions. Errors include misinterpretation of information, misconceptions,
forgetting or misapplying rules or instructions, use of wrong procedure for a given task or situation, missing a step or steps
in a specific sequence, and loss of flight control due to lack of proficiency, or failure of crew to follow prescribed
procedures needed to achieve flying accuracy and precision. Errors in this category can be further analyzed in terms of Jens
Rasmussen's (1987,1983) human information processing error theory (by further break down into knowledge, rule, or skill
errors).
Case Examples:
* S-3A -- Entered post-stall gyrations while practicing stall recovery. Pilot perceived that aircraft was spinning and crew
ejected.
* Fighter -- Struck ramp during refresher carrier landing. Pilot was known deck-spotter with previous poor performance
record.
Personality/Attitude. Personality refers to persistent patterns of behavior which epitomize our interpersonal style and
interactions. Attitudes refer to the combined belief, feeling, and intended behavior toward a particular person, idea, or
situation. Personality is relatively unmodifiable, but it is agreed that attitudes can be changed. Errors under this category are
mainly unsafe acts or behavior that are exemplified by such things as, habitual excess risk taking, stress reactions which
result in " acting out" hostility and aggression, over-estimation of flying ability, anti-authority and disregard for regulations.
Case Examples:
* SH-3G -- Pilot known as "habitual high risk taker" crashed while attempting to land. Aircraft was 500 lbs. over weight
limit.
* UH-1 -- Pilot, known to be bitter toward the service crashed while performing unauthorized ACM. Mishap pilot had
extensive history of prior safety violations.
Decision/Judgment. Capabilities and limitations in our ability to assess hazards and/or associated mission risk related to
aircrew skill level, aircraft limits or status, or environment. Errors include, flying aircraft outside safe limits, flying into
known adverse weather, continuing flight with known low fuel state, and intentional violation of flight discipline and/or
established safety regulations. This category can be further analyzed in terms of the "Unsafe Acts Model" proposed by
Reason (1990), as mistakes in judgment or violations. Application of the Reason model, to Navy aircraft mishaps was
discussed by Shappell and Wiegmann (1995). This model will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
Case Examples:
* C-12 -- Pilot took low fuel, and overweight aircraft,into poor weather, and crashed due to fuel starvation. All crew and
system warnings were ignored prior to the crash.
* F-18 -- Rolled over during landing in standing water, after experiencing gear link failure. This senior aviator refused
NATOPS training.
Aircrew Communication/Coordination. Refers to capabilities and limitations in a crew's the ability to transmit (talk) and
receive (listen)information using non-ambiguous (standard) language, to coordinate activity and divide task loading, and to
correctly interpret and act on information essential for task performance. Communication skills are known to be affected by
social, psychological, and group factors which sometimes create "social" communication barriers. The net result of a break-
down in crew coordination, however, is a failure of human communication. Errors include, use of non-standard language,
reluctance to talk or listen, failure to acknowledge a message (confirm by read back), failure to use all crew resources
available, and most seriously failure to respond or act on a warning input from another crewmember.
Case Examples:
* UH-1 -- Struck power lines while wondering off range. This lead pilot strongly resisted previous warnings from wingman
about navigation errors.
* SH-3 -- Crashed into water after taking controls from copilot and performing an unnecessary evasive maneuver. Pilot
perceived a training flare to be an approaching aircraft.(Copilot knew about flare training exercise, but did not tell other
crew members)
Design/Systems. Refers to aircraft, and/or support system equipment design deficiencies, including poor control or display
placement, inadequate displayed data, and poor documentation of system operation or maintenance procedures. These kinds
of design problems are believed to be "inducements" to pilot error because they may contribute to different forms of control
actions errors, as well as increasing aircrew workload.
Case Examples:
* A-6E -- Crashed while performing air-to-ground bombing run. This was fuel starvation mishap due to wrong switch
settings. A-6E has notorious problems with switch and indicator light locations.
* F-18 -- Crashed while performing VMC weapons delivery. Pilot had not selected proper ALT warning on HUD.Design
factors in presentation of HUD data were cited as possible cause factor.
Supervisory. Refers to leadership, culture and organizational factors such as general command climate, which is defined as
the attitudes, policies, and practices established by the command. Also considered is the level of supervisory control evident
in the command, and accountability for enforcing specific flight regulations, training, maintenance, and quality assurance.
Errors include such things as, poor command climate, failure to establish adequate standards, failure to monitor compliance
to standards, and failure to remove a known high-risk aviator.
Case Examples:
* CH-47 -- Impacted water after take-off from LPH. Pilot was designated HAC, but never completed the required NATOPS
training.
* EA-3 -- Impacted water after unsuccessful barricade arrestment. Pilot was known poor performer, placed in situation
exceeding his ability.
The Human Factors Checklist, presented later, is designed to codify and define some of the more common factors associated
with aircraft mishap cases. For most of the entries, in the Human Factors Checklist, there is a body of literature which
"explains" why some human errors occur. Selected portions of the checklist reflect the work of other authors in the area of
human factors and accident investigation (Alkov,1990,1989; Diehl,1989; Kayton, 1989; Reason,1992; Santilli,1985;
Sipes,1989, and others), who have also addressed human factors issues of accident causation.
The validity of the human factors checklist will depend, of course, upon on our ability to relate specific categories on the list
to underlying processes of human behavior. It will be equally important to demonstrate that the checklist is understandable
and helpful in the practical sense that aviators are comfortable using it (i.e. the checklist must have operational credibility
and utility).
It is important for the reader of this chapter to understand that the checklist is preliminary, in that required validation and
tests of operational usefulness have not been completed to date, and will be required prior to its acceptance and real-world
application. At this time the checklist is used primarily as a "teaching tool".
In its final version, the author hopes to add definitions of all terms used in the checklist, relevant case history synopses for
each major checklist category, and some appropriate selected reference material which supports the choice and application
of specific "human error sources". Case history information can be drawn from military safety center data bases, and human
performance data can be obtained from the human factors literature.
Findings from behavioral research, case history, and data on human performance capabilities/limitations will serve to defend
the selection of categories on the checklist and to explain occurrence of certain repetitive pilot/crew errors.
Application
An integral part of our safety officer training in the safety school is to provide the knowledge and skills necessary to fill the
gap in the aviators education in the area of "Human Factors". The Human Factors Checklist basically represents a
framework for organizing the human factor's subject matter.
In addition, the checklist provides ASO's with a something that they can take with them to aid in recalling key human
factor's issues and their potential application to accident investigation and prevention. Categories and items covered in the
checklist are based on content analysis across many military mishaps, and information about human performance
capabilities and limitations extracted from psychology, physiology, engineering and accident investigation literature. The
Human Factors Checklist is not considered to be a "taxonomy of human error", but rather a data collection device or
guideline for use during early phases of an accident investigation. Human error taxonomies, however, can be appropriately
applied given information collected via the checklist. While the utility of the checklist in the investigative process has yet to
be tested and validated, the author believes that, with some further work and trial application, checklists of this sort could be
a valuable aid in the air safety field.
Future Development of the Checklist
The next generation of the Human Factors Checklist will be revised and re-constructed to label and define items on the
checklist so that human cause elements can be more easily coded in accordance with the most current Appendix L of the
OPNAVINST 3750. Items presently on the checklist may also require minor revisions in labeling in order to facilitate
classification of cause factors using prevailing Human Error Taxonomies, such as the "Unsafe Acts Model" proposed by
Shappell and Wiegmann (1995).
In addition, the possibility of converting the Human Factors Checklist into a computer-based mishap investigation aid will
be explored. The application of state-of-the art hypertext/hyper media, relational data base, and on-screen interactivity
would enable a mishap investigator to point to an item on the checklist and immediately obtain (1) a definition of that item,
(2) evidence criteria for "accepting" that item, (3) a list of related mishap cases and selected case synopses (4) templates and
instructions for preparation of who, what, why cause factor elements. Each of the four, aforementioned would appear in a
"pop-up" menu dialogue box. For example, if the investigator pointed to "spatial disorientation", he/she could then use the
pop-up menu to select, a definition of spatial disorientation by type, case examples for which spatial disorientation was cited
in previous mishaps, conditions or evidence criteria (i.e. situations which induce spatial disorientation), and then receive
instruction and guidance on how to complete the Who/What/Why cause element sequence. Such a system would help to
standardize the evidence collection and analysis process, and would enable investigators to more efficiently code cause
factors for later human error analysis and entry into a mishap statistical data base.
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